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Discharged Employees: Should They Ever Have
Antitrust Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act?
The difficulty in interpreting and applying section 4 of the Clayton
Act,' which provides for private rights of action for treble damages
under the antitrust laws, is well-known.2 Two cases decided by the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits during 1982 indicate that the difficulty per-
sists with regard to the standing of discharged employees to sue for
antitrust violations.
Each case involved a defendant who entered into a conspiracy
with its competitors to reduce price competition in their industry. To
effectuate this aim the conspiracies sought to fix prices, allocate mar-
kets, and rig bids. Such acts constitute per se violations of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act.3 The plaintiff in each case was a key execu-
tive directed to assist in implementing the conspiracy. The cooperation
of these employees was essential to successfully carry out the price-
fixing, market-allocating, and bid-rigging. The executives refused to
cooperate and continued to do their jobs in a competitive manner. Af-
ter receiving pressure from other members of the conspiracies, each de-
fendant company discharged the plaintiff executive.
The plaintiff employees brought suit in federal court, seeking
treble damages under section 4. In each case the defendant was
granted summary judgment based on the plaintiff's lack of "antitrust
standing." Both plaintiffs appealed. The Seventh Circuit, in In re In-
dustrial Gas Antitrust Litigation (Bichan v. Chemetron Corp.),4 rigidly
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 4 provides, in pertinent part: "Any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee .. Id.
2. See generally 2 P. ARBEDA & D. TURNER, ANTIrRUST LAw § 333, at 160-63 (1978);
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 247, at 770-74 (1977).
-3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976). Per se violations are antitrust violations that are con-
demned under the ' ter se doctrine," which provides that "if an activity is blatant in its
intent and pernicious in its effect, a court need not inquire into the reasonableness of the
same before determining that it is a violation of the antitrust laws." This "implies that
certain types of business agreements, such as price-fixing, are considered inherently anti-
competitive and injurious to the public without any need to determine if the agreement has
actually injured market competition." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1028 (5th ed. 1979).
4. 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983). Justice Blackmun
voted to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment, and remand the case for further consideration
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applied conservative antitrust standing analysis and denied the plaintiff
standing to sue under section 4. The Ninth Circuit, however, in Ostrofe
v. HS. Crocker Co. ,5 eschewed such narrow standing analysis and in-
troduced a more flexible approach that gave standing to the discharged
employee. 6
Giving standing to discharged employees poses a serious and im-
portant challenge to the antitrust standing doctrine.7 While such a
plaintiff may have great potential for aiding in the enforcement of the
antitrust laws, the discharged employee does not fit neatly into the ana-
lytic rubrics and patterns of antitrust standing doctrine. This Comment
argues that neither the Ostrofe court nor the Bichan court developed a
satisfactory approach to the application of that standing doctrine to
employee-plaintiffs. The narrow approach of the Seventh Circuit justi-
fies the criticisms of traditional antitrust standing tests made by the
Ninth Circuit in Ostrofe. However, the Ninth Circuit's adoption of a
new and unworkable test went too far the other way. While the result
reached in Ostrofe is desirable, the court largely ignored antitrust
standing precedent, set forth essentially a non-test, applied the test un-
evenly, and failed to consider adequately the concept of "antitrust
injury."
This Comment first examines the somewhat confused doctrine of
"antitrust standing" as developed by the several circuits. The Com-
ment then discusses the concept of "antitrust injury" as articulated by
the Supreme Court. The Comment then analyzes the Ostrofe decision,
in contrast with the Bichan case. Finally, the Comment proposes an
in light of Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
5. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), remanded/or reconsideration, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the Ninth
Circuit for further consideration in light of Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983). See infra notes 87-100 &
accompanying text.
6. Such a conflict is not unique in the area of antitrust standing. Compare, e.g., Mul-
vey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prod., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923
(1971) (distributor granted standing) and Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 232
F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956) (lessor granted standing) with Fields Prod., Inc. v. United Artists
Corp., 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971) (distributor denied
standing) and Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 890 (1956) (lessor denied standing).
7. The extent of disagreement and uncertainty over the discharged employee as a po-
tential plaintiff is indicated by the situation within the Third Circuit, where two district
courts have ruled the opposite way while both claim to follow the same case law. Both
courts were confronted with a plaintiff who had been fired for refusing to cooperate in the
anticompetitive acts of his employer. See Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, Inc., 542 F. Supp.
776 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (trucker who refused to drive overweight loads and encouraged others
to do likewise was granted standing); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (sales manager who refused to engage in price discrimination was denied standing).
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approach that applies existing antitrust standing principles in allowing
antitrust standing to employees discharged for their refusal to cooper-
ate in the antitrust violations of their employers. The recommended
approach makes theper se or non-per se nature of the antitrust viola-
tion involved a major factor in determining whether or not the plaintiff
has standing to sue under section 4.
An Overview of the Antitrust Standing Doctrine
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "[a]ny person who shall
be injured in his business orproperty by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor. . . and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee."" This language could be construed to allow suits for
treble damages by any person for any injury causally related to an anti-
trust violation.9 The federal courts, however, have realized the impli-
cations of such a broad construction and have sought to limit the group
of persons allowed to sue for treble damages to include only "those
individuals whose protection is the fundamental purpose of the anti-
trust laws."' 0 This limitation has largely been accomplished through
construction of the phrases business or properly" and by reason of 12
found in section 4.13 The latter phrase generally has been narrowly
construed and has caused great confusion among the federal courts.' 4
The resut of this narrow construction is the confusing doctrine of anti-
8. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
9. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Morgan v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
10. Id "[S]tanding is a judicially created doctrine designed to foreclose recovery to
some plaintiffs. . . ." Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 885 (5th
Cir. 1982). This creation has occurred almost exclusively at the circuit court level, as the
Supreme Court has declined to act. See infra notes 51-69 & accompanying text.
11. Since "property" has such "naturally broad and inclusive meaning" and the statute
uses the disjunctive "or," this phrase is not a significant limitation. The Supreme Court has
construed it broadly, while acknowledging that it retains some restrictive significance, such
as excluding personal injuries. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1979).
12. "[To have standing to sue under the antitrust laws, plaintiffs must show not only
factual causation but also "legal causation," i.e., that the injury caused was of the type that
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.. . . This judicially-created standing obstacle is
based on the phrase 'by reason of" in section 4." California State Council of Carpenters v.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 648 F.2d 527, 537 & n.15 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd,
103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
13. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 126 (9th
Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom Morgan v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). "Judi-
cial constructions of standing under section 4 have keyed on the phrases 'business or prop-
erty' and 'by reason of' as indicating twin requisites for standing." Id
14. Id ("by reason of' has consistently eluded efforts at uniform definition or applica-
tion). See Note, Standing to Sue in Antitrust: The Application of Data Processing to Private
Treble Damages Actions, 11 TULSA LJ. 542, 544 (1976).
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trust standing. 15
The Direct Injury Test
The seminal case in the antitrust standing area is Loeb v. Eastman
Kodak Co. 16 The plaintiff, a stockholder and creditor of the victim
corporation, was denied the right to sue the violator corporation be-
cause he had not "receive[d] any direct injury from the alleged illegal
acts of the defendant."' 17 Any injury he did receive was "indirect, re-
mote, and consequential."1 8 The court reasoned that some barrier was
necessary to limit the private antitrust enforcement weapon and to pre-
vent a multiplicity of suits. 19
This "direct injury test" stood for forty years as the primary limita-
tion on antitrust standing. The test basically consists of an analysis of
the relationship between the alleged antitrust violator, the plaintiff, and
the alleged injury in a particular market. If the relationship is suffi-
ciently "direct," so that the alleged injury cannot be called "remote or
consequential," then the plaintiff has antitrust standing.
20
The frequent result of applying the test, however, has been that
courts focus solely on the relationship between the alleged violator and
15. Antitrust standing should not be confused with the better known judicial doctrine
of article III standing that establishes federal "case or controversy" jurisdiction. See gener-
ally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-17 to -29 (1978). Antitrust standing is
a unique "concept of proximate causation distinct from the concept of personal stake neces-
sary to establish article III jurisdiction. Our discussion here deals only with the former
concept which has been misnamed 'standing.'" Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434,
447 n.6 (3d Cir. 1977). The distinction between the two, how they relate to antitrust standing
analysis, and the problems caused by the misnomer of antitrust standing have been dis-
cussed by various commentators. See, e.g., Comment, Antitrust - Malamud v. Sinclair Oil
Corp. - The Sixth Circuit Applies the Data Processing "Zone of Interests" Test to Standing
Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 7 Loy. U. CHl. L.J. 546, 548-56 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Loyola Comment]; Comment, Standing to Sue Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Direct
Injury, Target Area, or Twilight Zone, 47 Miss. L.J. 502, 503-06 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Mississippi Comment].
16. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). This is the seminal case despite the fact that no antitrust
standing doctrine is explicitly discussed. The Loeb case actually antedates the Clayton Act,
which was enacted in 1914. The suit in Loeb was brought under old § 7 of the Sherman Act,
forerunner of the Clayton Act's § 4, which provided that "[any person who shall be injured
in his business or property. . . by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful
by this act, may sue. . . and shall recover three fold the damages by him sustained, and
the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat.
210 (1890).
17. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. at 709 (emphasis added).
18. Id. It is important to note that Loeb was decided well before MacPherson v. Buick
Motors Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), which led to the demise of privity in tort
law. Therefore, notions of privity were still strong in judicial analysis, even though privity
was not an express requirement in antitrust law.
19. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. at 709.
20. Id
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the plaintiff. The plaintiff is simply placed in a certain labelled class, 21
such as producers, competitors, suppliers, stockholders, creditors, em-
ployees, or lessors.22 The court then determines whether or not that
class has, or has been previously determined to have, the potential for
direct injury by an antitrust violation.2 3 This application has mini-
mized consideration of both the antitrust violation itself and the alleged
injury involved.24 Such a result is not necessarily mandated by the di-
rect injury test.25 The test is a very effective barrier to potential plain-
tiffs and, unlike some of its successors, is easy to apply.
The Target Area Test
The first major shift in antitrust standing doctrine occurred in Con-
ference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc. 26 While purporting to follow
the rule of Loeb, the Ninth Circuit actually created a new test.27 The
court looked at the antitrust conspiracy before it and conceded that it
could have many purposes and objects. A potential plaintiff had to do
more than just show that one or more of those objects was an antitrust
violation and that an act of the conspiracy had harmed him. The
21. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 127 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nomr Morgan v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
22. See, e.g., Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976) (corporate officer); Fields Prod., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971) (distributor); Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc.
v. Association of Casualty & Sur. Co., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967) (franchisor); Volasco
Prod. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
907 (1963) (supplier); Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1957) (sole stockholder);
Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956)
(lessor); Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prod. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956) (patentee-licensee); United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated
Copper Co., 232 F. 574 (2d Cir. 1916) (shareholders).
23. For examples of routine application of the direct injury test without analysis, see
Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 732 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971); Ash v. International Business Mach. Corp., 353 F.2d 491, 493-94 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966).
24. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 22.
25. Most notably, the application of the direct injury test over-emphasizes the preven-
tion of excessive liability and duplicative recoveries and under-emphasizes the enforcement
goals of § 4. For an example of this downplaying of the enforcement interest, see S.C.M.
Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 407 F.2d 166, 171 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943
(1969).
26. 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). In this case a group of
labor unions brought suit for loss of work due to an alleged conspiracy between several
movie studios and a larger union to restrain trade.
27. It is noteworthy that this suit was brought during a period in which the number of
private antitrust actions was increasing. See Posner,.4 Statistical Study ofAntitrust Enforce-
ment, 13 J. L. & ECON. 365, 370-72 (1970). The attendant increase in the variety of plaintiffs
and theories of suit probably presented a tough challenge to the application of the direct
injury test.
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plaintiff had to show that "he is within that area of the economy which
is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular
industry. '28 This shifted the focus from the relationship between the
violator and the plaintiff to the relationship between the economic area
affected by the defendant's violation and the plaintiff.
29
The test of Conference of Studio Unions became known as the "tar-
get area test."'30 Its basic application includes two steps. First, the tar-
get area of the alleged violation, that is, the area of the economy
affected, is defined. Second,the plaintiff is "located" or "placed." If he
is located in that defined area, he has standing.31 If he is not so located,
he does not. Like the direct injury test, the target area test appears
simple enough, but its consistent application has proven elusive and
difficult.32
The Ninth Circuit led in the development and refinement of the
target area test over the two decades following Conference of Studio
Unions.33 Because the relationship on which the court focused had
changed,34 there was a subtle shift from looking at the directness of the
injury to looking at the "aim" taken at the target area.35 Application of
the target area test allowed the court to give greater consideration to
the nature of the violation and the injury involved. 36 Also, the court
could openly consider the broader social and economic goals of the
antitrust laws in its analysis. 37 At the same time, the Ninth Circuit
28. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d at 54-55.
29. The Ninth Circuit held that such a construction of the "by reason of" phrase of § 4
was "in accordance with the basic and underlying purposes of the anti-trust laws to preserve
competition and to protect the consumer." Id at 55.
30. The actual term "target area" was first used in Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp.,
221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
31. But cf. John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 499 (9th Cir.
1977) (the alleged injury must be located or placed). The fully developed target area test is
not quite this simple. See infra notes 33-44 & accompanying text.
32. Defining the target area itself can lead to subsidiary "tests." See, e.g., Calderone
Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972) (using direct injury-type analysis to identify the target
area).
33. The Ninth Circuit's leadership in the development of antitrust standing doctrine,
especially the more liberal developments, has been noted. See, e.g., id at 1300 (Levet, J.,
dissenting); Comment, Antitrust - Treble Damages Actions - Private Litigant Whose Injury
Was Reasonably Foreseeable Has Standing to Sue, 24 VAND. L. REV. 803, 805 (1971).
34. See supra text accompanying note 29.
35. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955).
36. Id at 364-65.
37. "Free enterprise is a basic concept of our economy but contained therein is the
corollary of free and fair competition. The broad scope of the antitrust laws. . . thus gave
substance to those basic concepts and corollaries." Id. at 365. The Ninth Circuit has not
been alone in these considerations. See, e.g., Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552
F.2d 90, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1977). It is also noteworthy that the Karseal court, while relying
squarely on Conference of Studio Unions, does not repudiate the direct injury test of Loeb,
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made it clear that it was not necessarily enough that the plaintiff was
simply within the target area of the violator's illegal practices.38 A
stronger causal link was required. To dispel the possible interpretation
of this causal link as being "intent," the Ninth Circuit introduced the
concept of "reasonable foreseeability" to antitrust standing analysis.39
It was enough that the plaintiff was "actually in the area which it could
reasonably be foreseen would be affected by the conspiracy."'4
Thus, the target area test would seem to require a third step be-
yond identifying the target area and placing the plaintiff.41 In this step
the relationship between the violator, the violation, and the plaintiff is
analyzed. It is the nature and extent of this analysis that is the major
cause of the confusion among the circuits that utilize the target area
test.42 Indeed, the target area test has proven to be almost as malleable
in its interpretation and application as the section 4 language itself.43 It
but only the privity notions associated with it. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221
F.2d 358, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1955). These privity notions have continued to be a stigma at-
tached to the direct injury test, despite their repudiation by courts applying the direct injury
test. See, e.g., Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.
1943).
38. If the plaintiff was "hit" by the violation's effect, was the plaintiff" 'aimed at' with
enough precision to entitle it to maintain a treble damages suit under the Clayton Act?"
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955).
39. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964). See Alioto & Donnici, Standing Requirements for Antitrust
Plaintiffs: Judicially Created Exceptions to a Clear Statutory Policy, 4 U.S.F.L. REv. 205,
212-14 (1970) ("more in line with the intent behind Section 4 and the Supreme Court's
liberal construction").
40. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964). The Ninth Circuit further developed this concept of reasonable
foreseeability in antitrust standing analysis in Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480 (9th
Cir. 1967), and in Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prod., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971). See generally Comment, Standing Under Clayton § 4:. A Prover-
bial Mystery, 77 DIcK. L. REy. 73 (1972); Comment, supra note 33. The Ninth Circuit
seemed to move away from foreseeability in the much vaunted case In re Multidistrict Vehi-
cle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Morgan v.
Automobile Mfr. Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), but clearly reaffirmed its adherence to the
concept in Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally Sher-
man, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 374 (1976).
41. See supra notes 30-32 & accompanying text.
42. See Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1233 (6th Cir. 1981) ("That
standard... has spawned numerous and often inconsistent opinions attempting to deline-
ate its scope.").
43. See, e.g., Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979)
(adopting Karseals "aimed at" language); Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979) (using the Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution
formulation of the target area test); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971) (blending direct injury test into the target area
test to form a hybrid test); Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. Association of Casualty
& Sur. Co., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967) (deciding that the direct injury test and the target
area test are really the same test); South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v.
is less of a barrier than the direct injury test, because some potential
plaintiffs who were formerly in a "forbidden class" have a chance of
gaining standing.44
Other Tests
Some circuits have found neither the direct injury test nor any of
the variations of the target area test satisfying. These courts have intro-
duced different tests, compounding the inconsistency and confusion.
The first such test was announced by the Sixth Circuit in Malamud v.
Sinclair Oil Corp. 45 The court found existing antitrust standing law too
restrictive, as it foreclosed claims prematurely. In formulating an alter-
native, the court borrowed the administrative law doctrine of protected
zones. 46 Each law has a zone of various interests it is designed to pro-
tect. All a plaintiff need show to gain standing, said the court, is an
"injury in fact" to an interest "within the zones protected" by the anti-
trust laws. This test became known as the "zone of interests test."
47
Another test was developed in the Third Circuit, where the direct
injury test originated. In Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equipment
Corp. 48 the court sought to integrate the facts of the case with elements
of all three of the existing tests. This hybrid became known as the "fac-
tual matrix test." 49
Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966) (introducing the "proxi-
mate cause" target area test).
44. See, e.g., Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979)
(distributor); Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1967) (lessor); Sanitary Milk
Producers v. Bergians Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1966) (suppliers); Karseal
Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955) (franchisor).
45. 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
46. Id at 1151-52. The Sixth Circuit relied on Association of Data Processing Serv.
Org.. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
47. Though acknowledged by other circuits, the zone of interests test has remained
unique to the Sixth Circuit. It has been noted with approval by the Ninth Circuit. Califor-
nia State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 648 F.2d 527,
n.18 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983). Due to its novelty, the Malamnud decision
itself has been the subject of much commentary. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 40; Com-
ment, Antitrust Law - Standing- 4 PlaintiffAlleging Actual Injury to an Interest Arguably
Within Zone Protected By the Federal Antitrust Law Has Standing to Sue Under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act - Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975), 45 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 100 (1976); Loyola Comment, supra note 15; Comment, Antitrust: Broaden-
ing of Standing in Private Litigation Under Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 10 VAL. U.L. REV.
385 (1976).
48. 543 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1976).
49. "Each case, therefore, must be carefully analyzed in terms of the particular factual
matrix presented.. . . courts must look to, among other factors, the nature of the industry
in which the alleged antitrust violation exists, the relationship of the plaintiff to the alleged
violator, and the alleged effect of the antitrust violation upon the plaintiff." Id. at 506. A
year later, the Third Circuit modified this test slightly, calling it the "functional analysis
test." Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977). It later modi-
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With the variations of the target area test, there are scarcely two
circuits sharing the same antitrust standing test. This is less alarming
than it might be, due to the fact that the concerns underlying all of the
tests are essentially the same.50
The Supreme Court, Antitrust Standing, and Antitrust Injury
Despite the history of conflict among the circuits over antitrust
standing doctrine, the Supreme Court has never announced a clear, de-
finitive test of antitrust standing.5' The Court has only implicity ap-
proved of the existence of the antitrust standing doctrine, if at all. The
Court has generally decided the few antitrust standing cases to come
before it on rather narrow grounds, referring only incidentally to the
doctrine of antitrust standing.52
Antitrust Standing: Some Guidelines
The Supreme Court has made general pronouncements concern-
ing the purpose and goals of section 4 that are highly relevant to stand-
ing analysis. The Court has held that section 4 has two purposes: to
deter violators by depriving them of the fruits of their violations, and to
compensate victims of antitrust violations for their injuries.53 Private
actions under section 4 are "a bulwark of antitrust enforcement" and
fled it even further, to incorporate the principles of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977), and Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), in Mid-West
Paper Prod. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979). One commentator
has traced this circuit's efforts in Note, The Third Circuit's "FunctionalAna lsis':" Patrolling
the Portals to Treble Damage Actions Brought Under Section 4 afthe Clayton Act, 21 B.C.L.
REv. 659 (1980).
50. The differences have been called "largely semantic." Note, Standing to Sue in Pri-
vate Antitrust Litigatior Circuits in Conflict, 10 IND. L. REv. 532 (1977) (setting forth a
thorough, though partially dated, summary of the circuits' tests). This inherent similarity
has facilitated the switch by a circuit from one test to another. See, e.g., Engine Specialties,
Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979); Note,ARecent Decisions- Standing to Sue
in the First Circuit Under Section 4 ofthe Clayton Act, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 396 (1981)
(pointing out, in reviewing the First Circuit's switch from the direct injury test to the target
area test, the small difference between the two tests). Other commentators have found the
conflict more disturbing and have argued the need for uniformity. See, e.g., Comment,
supra note 40, at 83 (raising the possibility of forum-shopping); Mississippi Comment, supra
note 15, at 502-03.
51. The Court recently indicated that it may not even be possible to set forth such a
test. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 908 (1983) ("the infinite variety of claims that may arise make it
virtually impossible to announce a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every
case").
52. See, e.g., Blue Shield ofVa. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982); Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). But see Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969)
(clearly discrediting the direct injury test).
53. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978).
"will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone comtemplating business
behavior in violation of the antitrust laws."' 54 The Court has indicated
that summary judgment motions, in which standing is often challenged,
should be granted sparingly in antitrust litigation 55 and that courts
should be slow to expand such procedural prohibitions to antitrust
suits. 56 They should not "burden the private litigant beyond what is
specifically set forth by Congress in [the antitrust] laws." 57
If section 4 is to be a "bulwark," who are the appropriate plain-
tiffs? As early as 1948 the Court held that "[t]he statute does not con-
fine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or
to sellers. . . . The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage,
protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by
whomever they are perpetrated."58 If all such protected victims were
truly potential plaintiffs, this would lead to an unrestricted interpreta-
tion of section 4. The potency of the treble damages remedy dictated
the need for careful application,59 however, and the Supreme Court
later held that there must be some closer causal connection between the
antitrust violation and the injury alleged. 60
The Supreme Court has further limited the pool of potential plain-
tiffs. For example, the Court has held that the antitrust laws were
designed and intended to protect competition, not competitors. 61 The
plaintiff must therefore be an efficient enforcer of antitrust policies.
62
The economic costs of allowing the plaintiff to seek and be awarded
treble damages must be outweighed by the economic benefit to the
competitive structure being protected. 63 To this end, the plaintiff must
54. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
55. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
56. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660
(1961).
57. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957).
58. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948) (citations omitted).
59. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982).
60. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 696-702
(1962); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 253-54 (1946); see also Note, Standing
to Suefor Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570, 575-
76 (1964).
61. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). The Court has con-
ceded that persons who are unilaterally injured by a member of a conspiracy can attack the
overall conspiracy, if the unilateral action is synonomous with the intent of the conspiracy
itself. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). TheRadovich case is often cited for
more expansive positions such as the unqualified standing of employees to sue for treble
damages. See, e.g., Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 98 n.19 (3d Cir.
1977); Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1967).
62. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
63. See id. The Illinois Brick opinion clearly stated that it was not a standing case, but
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not be too remote from the violator or the violation. If plaintiffs who
are too remote are allowed to recover, the problem of duplicative re-
coveries arises. Duplicative recoveries can lead to overdeterrence,
which actually harms competition and is the opposite of the result
desired.64
Although the Supreme Court has yet to set forth any uniform test
of antitrust standing, it seemed to discredit the direct injury test in Per-
kins v. Standard Oil Co. 65 The Perkins Court held that such a "limita-
tion is wholly artificial and is completely unwarranted by the language
or purpose of the Act."' 66 However, the Court declined to acknowledge
that all limitations on antitrust standing are largely artificial. The
Court tacitly approved of the general existence of antitrust standing
limitations in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. ,67 noting that the "lower
courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress did
not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all
injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation." 68
rather a case of remoteness and duplicative recoveries. Id at 728 & n.7. This has not pre-
vented circuit courts from using these related principles in the standing context. See, e.g.,
Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261
(1983); Mid-West Paper Prod. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
64. Overdeterrence is a concept that has received growing attention from the commen-
tators in the wake of the Supreme Court's major decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720 (1977). See Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to
Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 467, 472-76, 497-500 (1980); Landes & Posner, Should
Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis
ofthe Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 602, 605-08, 634-35 (1979); see also Dam,
Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 47, 54-56 (1975).
65. 395 U.S. 642 (1969). This case actually centered on an interpretation of § 2(d) of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The Ninth Circuit has reasoned, however, that "the opinion
argues forcefully by analogy against 'direct injury' analysis." In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Morgan Auto-
mobile Mfr. Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
66. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. at 647. The Supreme Court may have given
back some credibility to the direct injury test in a recent decision. See Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 906
(1983).
67. 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (involving aparenspatriae suit by the state for damages to its
general economy as the result of antitrust violations). Though it makes an oft-quoted refer-
ence to the antitrust standing doctrine, Hawaii stands, along with Illinois Brick, for the pol-
icy against duplicative recoveries and overdeterrence. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready,
457 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1982).
68. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 263 n.14. One circuit decision read this
statement in conjunction with the Court's undermining of the direct injury test in Perkins to
conclude that the Court favors the target area test. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution
M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 128-29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. Morgan Automobile
Mfr. Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). One commentator has suggested that the Ninth Circuit
may have stopped too short, and that under the Supreme Court's analysis the target area test
should not delimit "the outermost permissible bounds of treble damage standing." See
The Court has also recognized that the tests developed by the circuits
may conflict,69 but has declined to act.
The Brunswick Doctrine: Antitrust Injury
The Supreme Court's opinion in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-
0-Mat, Inc. 70 had a significant impact on antitrust standing doctrine. 71
In Brunswick, the plaintiff alleged an illegal vertical merger by a com-
petitor in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.72 The merger inten-
sified price competition that injured plaintiff's business, and the
plaintiff sought treble damages. 73 The Supreme Court, in denying re-
lief, recognized the inherent conflict between the prophylactic nature of
section 7 and the "remedial" nature of section 4 treble damages. 74 The
Court flatly rejected the notion that it is enough to allege an antitrust
violation and an injury causally linked to that violation; such a holding
would "[divorce] antitrust recovery from the purposes of the antitrust
laws without a clear statutory command to do so . . . .-5 To allow
recovery in a suit based on increased competition would "make Section
4 recovery entirely fortuitous, and would authorize damages for losses
which are no concern to the antitrust laws."' 76 The Court then intro-
duced the concept of "antitrust injury," which is "injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes defendants' acts unlawful. '77
The full meaning of the concept of antitrust injury and its relation-
ship to antitrust standing analysis is not readily apparent from the
Supreme Court's definition. At a minimum, it means that in addition
to causing an injury to the plaintiff, the defendant's unlawful acts must
Note, Antitrust - Standing to Sue Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 723,
733-34 (1974). Probably even more significant than this footnote reference in Hawaii is the
repeated denial of certiorari by the Court in antitrust standing cases. See, e.g., supra notes 6,
9, 22, 23, 25, 26, 32, 39, 40, 43 and the cases cited therein; see also Handier, Changing Trends
in Antitrust Doctrines.- An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term - 1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
979, 994 & n.89 (1977).
69. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476 n.12 (1982) ("[wle have no
occasion here to evaluate the relative utility of any of these possibly confficting
approaches").
70. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
71. The significance of the decision has been questioned, however, with one writer call-
ing it "old wine in a new bottle." Calvani, The Mushrooming Brunswick Defense: Injury to
Competition, Not to Plaintiff, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 319, 330 (1981). See also Page, supra note
64, at 467-72.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
73. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 479-84.
74. Id at 485.
75. Id. at 487.
76. Id (footnote omitted).
77. Id. at 489 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 125
(1969)).
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also cause injury to competition in the given market area. Problems
arise when determining to what extent the two injuries must be con-
nected, or more specifically, if the injury to the plaintiff must flow di-
rectly from the injury to competition.78 The only real assistance offered
by the Supreme Court in determining the scope and placement of the
antitrust injury concept is that the concept is not limited to section 7
violations79 and is not relevant solely to standing problems.80
Similar problems exist in defining the relationship between anti-
trust standing and antitrust injury. It is unclear whether antitrust in-
jury adds a step to each of the standing tests, or if it is a separate test to
be addressed only if the plaintiff first establishes standing. Circuit
courts have decided both ways. The Ninth and Sixth Circuits have
ruled that antitrust injury adds a step to their different standing tests.8 '
The Third and Fifth Circuits have kept the two concepts separate.82
The Fourth Circuit has indicated that the antitrust injury doctrine,
however viewed, may not even apply to all antitrust violations.8 3 This
latter holding lends support to the view that the two concepts should be
kept separate.
An antitrust plaintiff must prove antitrust injury in order to ulti-
mately prevail.8 4 However, to gain standing a plaintiff should only
have to make a sufficient allegation of antitrust injury, notprove it.85
Though antitrust standing and antitrust injury share many underlying
principles and serve the common goal of restricting antitrust plaintiffs
to those intended to be protected by section 4, they are distinct con-
cepts. They should be kept separate for analytical purposes. This doc-
78. See Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 599 F.2d 1299, 1303 (4th Cir. 1979) ("We
think that there is little reason to believe that this unanimous holding of the Court was
intended to announce a radical revision of the law of private antitrust damages actions.").
79. See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981). In a case
involving price discrimination, a violation of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, the Court held that
its "decision here is virtually governed by our reasoning in Brunswick." Id at 562.
80. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-84 (1982) (utilizing Bruns-
wick in Court's discussion of "remoteness" doctrine, when it had declined to address stand-
ing issue).
81. John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 498-99 (9th Cir. 1977);
Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1232 (6th Cir. 1981). But see Bosse v.
CroweU Collier & MacMillan, 565 F.2d 602, 607 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977) (indicating that John
Lenore & Co. may be limited to § 7 cases).
82. Mid-West Paper Prod. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 582 (3d Cir.
1979); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 671 F.2d 876, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1982).
83. Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 599 F.2d 1299, 1302-04 (4th Cir. 1979) (court
distinguishes per se and non-per se violations).
84. Inper se violation cases, the injury to competition can be presumed, thus lightening
the plaintiff's initial burden. See supra note 3.
85. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699
(1962).
trinal area is confusing enough as it is.86
The Latest Word: Associated General Contractors
A recent Supreme Court decision may have substantial impact on
the antitrust standing doctrine. In Associated General Contractors of
California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,87 the Court
approached the doctrine, but again declined to resolve the confusion.
Instead, the Court offered various "factors" for lower courts to consider
in their standing analysis.88 The Court's decision reversed a Ninth Cir-
cuit grant of standing to a group of labor unions. 89 The unions alleged
injuries due to a boycott by defendant contractors of various other con-
tractors and subcontractors.9" The Court was particularly troubled by
the vagueness of the unions' allegations, as to both violations and
damages. 91
After acknowledging the broad language of section 4, as well as its
own broad interpretations of that language, the Supreme Court en-
gaged in historical analysis aimed at narrowing this interpretation. 92
The Court concluded that, "as was required in common-law damages
litigation in 1890, the question requires us to evaluate the plaintiffs
harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendants, and the relationship
between them."'93 This statement could be interpreted to support any
of the established antitrust standing tests.94 The Court noted the sev-
eral major standing tests developed by the circuits and the potential
contradictions and inconsistencies among them. The Court, however,
did not strike them down. Instead, it urged lower courts to look to
86. See Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 12 n. 16 (1st Cir. 1979);
Handler, supra note 68, at 994-97; Page, supra note 64, at 497 ("it is useful to keep the
concepts separate"). In a recent decision, the Supreme Court appears to take this view.
After acknowledging and listing the various antitrust standing tests, the Court stated that it
had "no occasion here to evaluate the relative utility of any of these possibly conflicting
approaches toward the problem of remote antitrust injury." Blue Shield of Va. v. Mc-
Cready, 457 U.S. 465, 476 n.12 (1982).
87. 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
88. Id at 907 n.33.
89. California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc.,
648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980). See infra notes 120-23 & accompanying text.
90. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
103 S. Ct. at 900-01. The Court was notably uncomfortable with labor unions as antitrust
plaintiffs, in view of the historically tenuous relationship between labor law and antitrust
law. Id at 909-11.
91. Id. at 902-04. The Court agreed with the dissenting judge on the Ninth Circuit that
the allegations had more of the sound of a labor dispute.
92. Id at 904-07. The Court looked at both the legislative history and related common
law concepts.
93. Id. at 907.
94. It is noteworthy that the only circuit standing case cited in the text by the Court,
and with approval, was Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
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precedent and to use the Court's "factors" in their analysis - implying
that these factors be incorporated into the existing tests.95
The Court's suggested "factors" were varied, and some were by no
means new. They included the causal connection between the antitrust
violation and the harm of the plaintiff, the nature of the injury, and the
presence or absence of intent of the defendant to cause injury to the
plaintiff9 6 Courts were instructed to remember "the central interest in
protecting the economic freedom of participants in the relevant mar-
ket."'97 Other factors mentioned included the identity of the plaintiff
(in this case a union), the directness or indirectness of the injury (this
was too remote), the nature of the damages (they were too speculative),
and the judicial system's interest in preventing duplicative recoveries
and controlling complex litigation.98 After analyzing these factors, the
Associated General Contractors Court concluded that the unions were
not the "direct victims" of the alleged boycott and, hence, lacked
standing.99
The scope of the Associated General Contractors decision is uncer-
tain.°0 It appears to signal a deceleration of the expansion of antitrust
standing, as well as a new emphasis on a more balancing-type analysis.
The decision's message is important in considering the potential stand-
ing of the discharged employee.
Antitrust Standing and Employee-Plaintiffs
The case law dealing with the standing of employees to sue their
employers or other antitrust law violators'01 for treble damages under
section 4 is not extensive. One reason is that employees are considered
to be one of the "forbidden classes" under the direct injury test.10 2 This
notion appears to have carried over into the target area test, so that
employees are seldom within the target area of an antitrust violation. 10 3
95. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
103 S. Ct. at 907 & n.33.
96. Id at 908-09.
97. Id at 909.
98. Id at 909-12.
99. Id at 913. The conclusion was based as much on the pervasive vagueness of the
allegations and the tension between labor law and antitrust law as on the "factors"
discussed.
100. "We therefore need not decide whether the direct victim of a boycott, who suffers a
type of injury unrelated to antitrust policy, may recover damages when the ultimate purpose
of the boycott is to restrain competition in the relevant economic market." Id at 910 n.44.
101. The distinction is important because suing "other" violators raises the spectre of
duplicative recoveries, i.e., by the victim firm and by its employees. Cf. Bravman v. Bassett
Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 96 n.7, 98-99 (3d Cir. 1977).
102. See, e.g., Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cer. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976) (corporate officer denied standing because an "employee").
103. The most prominent exception to this general statement is the situation where the
The Fifth Circuit, in Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc. ,'04 was the
first circuit court to clearly allow an employee standing under modem
antitrust standing analysis. The plaintiff, a commissioned salesman,
was allowed to sue his employer for income lost as a result of a reduc-
tion of his sales territory due to his employer's violation of section 7 of
the Clayton Act.' 0 5 The court borrowed the Seventh Circuit's analysis
of the business and property phrase of section 4106 and the Fourth Cir-
cuit's analysis of the by reason of phrase. 0 7 The court found that the
plaintiff had alleged sufficient injury to his business by reason of his
employer's antitrust violation to gain standing under the "reasonable
foreseeability" target area test. l0 8
Faced with a factual situation similar to that in Dailey, the Tenth
Circuit reached an opposite result in Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 109
The plaintiff, a salaried employee, was terminated when his job was
eliminated during a reorganization that followed an illegal merger.
The court made the rather tenuous distinction that the plaintiffs in
other cases" o were "quasi-businessmen" who had carved out a pari of
the competitive market affected by the antitrust violations, whereas the
plaintiff here was only a regular employee."'l Despite an extended dis-
cussion of causal connection and proximate cause, the case was decided
on the basis of this distinction and by the court's application of the
direct injury test."12 The discharge was too indirect an injury, and it
would have occured whether the merger was legal or illegal, making it
employment market is itself the target area of the violation. See Radovich v. National Foot-
ball League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
104. 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
106. Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967); Roseland v.
Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942). Roseland was a rare pre-target area test case
involving an employee-plaintiff. The Seventh Circuit did not actually discuss standing as it
is discussed today, since it focused on the "business or property" phrase of § 4. The court
held that the plaintiff salesman had lost sales commissions because of the alleged violation,
and thus had standing because those lost commissions fit within the "business or property"
definition. In Nichols, the Seventh Circuit followed Roseland fairly closely, despite the "by
reason of" prevalance that had developed in the intervening 25 years. Again, standing was
granted to the plaintiff without discussing antitrust standing doctrine as such. Most "busi-
ness or property" analysis has now been minimized by the Supreme Court's holding in Rei-
ter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330 (1979). See supra note 11.
107. South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966).
108. Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d at 487-88.
109. 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1973).
110. The court discussed Roseland, Nichols, and Dailey in the course of its analysis.
111. Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d at 730.
112. Id. at 730-33 ("the 'directness rule' appears to be a practical application of the
Clayton Act"). While the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its adherence to the direct injury test, it is
useful to note the frequent use of "target area language," which is not uncommon in stand-
ing cases.
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a mere "outgrowth of the alleged unlawful act." Therefore, the plain-
tiff lacked standing to sue.13
The Ninth Circuit Prior to Ostrofe
The Ninth Circuit has been generally active in this segment of an-
titrust standing development. In Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's,
Inc. ,'14 the Ninth Circuit not only originated the target area test, but
also first considered employee antitrust standing. The plaintiff employ-
ees" 5 were denied standing because they were not in the target area
protected." 6 In Solinger v. A & MRecords, Inc. ,17 the plaintiff sued in
a dual capacity as the prospective purchaser and as an employee of the
victim corporation. The Ninth Circuit applied the "reasonably foresee-
able" target area test. Only in his capacity as a prospective entrant to
the market was the plaintiff foreseeably within the area affected by a
section 1 or 2 violation and did he have standing; his loss of salary was
"merely incidental,"' 18 exemplifying the fine lines being drawn in these
cases."' 9
The Ninth Circuit made a notable shift in Calfornia State Council
of Carpenters v. Associated General Contractors of Caiffornia, Inc. 120
Plaintiff employees, through their union, were permitted to sue under
the target area test. On its face, this decision could appear to be an
accepted exception because the market area affected and endangered
113. Id at 732-33. One authority has discussed the decision with strong approval, stat-
ing that the "analysis of the Reibert case is instructive." 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 2, § 338, at 195. The Tenth Circuit was faced with a more difficult question in Farnell
v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff there, a newspa-
per vendor, was a "quasi-businessman," similar to the plaintiffs in Roseland, Nichols, and
Dailey. The alleged §§ I and 2 violations were directed squarely at the plaintiff and other
vendors. The court, however, followed only the causation test set forth in Reibert and de-
nied standing because of the technical reason for the discharge (insubordination). Id at
500-01.
114. 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). See supra notes 26-29
& accompanying text.
115. The plaintiffs were actually a group of small unions, but the distinction has not
traditionally been significant in antitrust standing analysis. But see supra notes 87-100 &
accompanying text.
116. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d at 54-55. This position was
solidly adhered to in Contreras v. Grower Shipper Vegetable Ass'n, 484 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974), where standing was denied plaintiff farmworkers
based on a strict target area analysis.
117. 586 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979).
118. Id at 1311-12.
119. In Program Eng'g, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 634 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980),
the court again "split" the grant of standing. Plaintiff company was allowed standing, while
plaintiff company president was denied standing because his loss of salary was "merely inci-
dental," following Solinger. Id at 1191.
120. 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
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by the violations was determined to be the employment market.' 2'
However, some language used by the court foreshadowed a shift in the
Ninth Circuit's view of antitrust standing towards a policy-oriented ap-
proach. Non-foreseeable litigants, such as employees, should be al-
lowed standing if to do so would enhance enforcement of antitrust
policies. 122 Despite the decision's eventual reversal, its analysis is sig-
nificant - and it is important because it set the stage for Ostrofe v. H S.
Crocker Co. 123
Depite the rather small number of employee-plaintiff cases, certain
patterns emerge. Employee-plaintiffs are frequently treated as a la-
belled class presumed to lack standing. 124 If the market affected by the
alleged violations is the employment market, however, they may gain
standing. 125 If the plaintiff can assert that he is a quasi-businessman,
his chances improve. 26 His chances are also improved if he is an em-
ployee of the violator, rather than the victim. 127 Overall, however,
minimal attention is given to the nature of the violation or the nature of
any relationship besides the bare employer-employee relationship. 128
The Discharged Employee as an Antitrust Plaintiff:
Circuits in Conflict
Ostrofe
The defendant in Ostrofe v. HS. Crocker Co. 129 was a paper litho-
121. This "exception" has been established since Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445 (1957). See supra note 61. At the same time, the factual situation was not very
different from Conference of Studio Unions, which the court did not overrule. See supra
notes 26-29, 114-16 & accompanying text. The dissent stated that "[w]hen all is said and
done, this is a labor case wearing an antitrust costume .... " California State Council of
Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 648 F.2d at 543 (Sneed, J., dissent-
ing). The Supreme Court agreed with this dissent. In reversing, the Court also implicitly
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's characterization of the target area, since it identified the
affected area of the economy as the contracting and subcontracting market. See Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 911-
12 (1983).
122. California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc.,
648 F.2d at 538 n.18 ("systematic denial of standing on foreseeability grounds may result in
the dismissal of actions which would otherwise further both the deterrent and compensation
purposes of the Act").
123. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), remandedfor reconsideration, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
124. See supra notes 102-03 & accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 61, 121 & accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 104-08 & accompanying text. But see supra notes 109-13 & accom-
panying text.
127. See supra note 101 & accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976); Contreras v. Grower Shipper Vegetable Ass'n, 484 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974).
129. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), remandedfor reconsideration, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
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graph labels manufacturer. The plaintiff, Frank J. Ostrofe, was the
company's marketing director. Crocker allegedly entered into a con-
spiracy with other unnamed manufacturers of paper lithograph labels,
aimed at reducing competition in that industry. The conspiracy
contemplated price-fixing, bid-rigging, and customer and territory
allocation. 130
As marketing director, Ostrofe would necessarily play a key role in
putting such a conspiracy into action. He alleged that he was ordered
to rig bids, fix prices and allocate markets. When he refused to do so
and continued to do his job in a competitive manner, the other conspir-
ators complained to Crocker. Ostrofe was threatened with economic
reprisals, including discharge,' 3 ' if he failed to cooperate. He contin-
ued to refuse to do so and was forced to resign. 32
Ostrofe brought suit against Crocker in federal district court seek-
ing damages under the Sherman Act. 33 His initial complaint alleged
injuries due to the conspiracy, which was in violation of section 1 of the
Act.' 34 The complaint also mentioned of a boycott agreement by the
conspirators not to hire or rehire discharged employees, such as Os-
trofe, who did not cooperate in the scheme. Crocker moved to dismiss
on the grounds that Ostrofe lacked standing to sue under section 4 of
the Clayton Act. The district court agreed, but denied dismissal so that
it could hear the boycott issue.135
Crocker then moved for summary judgment, presenting deposi-
tions and affidavits supporting the lack of any conspiracy to boycott
Ostrofe from the paper labels industry. In response, Ostrofe reasserted
the actions that led to his resignation. While Crocker's motion was
pending, Ostrofe moved to amend his complaint. 36 Ostrofe sought to
allege that Crocker had unilaterally refused to deal with him by forcing
him to resign, in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. 37 The district
130. Id at 1380. Most, if not all, of these acts would constituteper se violations of the
Sherman Act. See supra note 3.
131. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1380. Other threatened reprisals included
denial of promised financial compensation or greater share in management. Id
132. Id This statement of fact is disputed. The appellate briefs argued, and the dissent
accepts, that Ostrofe resigned voluntarily. See id at 1391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
133. The court does not indicate why Ostrofe chose to sue under the antitrust laws.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
135. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1380.
136. Id There was probably good motivation for this motion to amend. Ostrofe's claim
of a boycott was weak, as he had scant evidence that there was one. In addition, Ostrofe
never looked for another similar job in the industry. See id at 1391 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
137. If Ostrofe were allowed to so plead, he would have been aided in proving the § I
conspiracy by the earlier government actions against Crocker and other conspirators, which
had resulted in nolo pleas and some jail sentences. See Petition for Rehearing Brief for
Appellee at 9-10, Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982); see also United
court viewed such an attempt as an indirect method of complaining of
the overall conspiracy, which it had ruled he had no standing to do.
Consequently, the motion to amend was denied and the summary judg-
ment was granted. 38
Ostrofe appealed to the Ninth Circuit. That court's stated basis for
reversal was that the district court erred in "fragmenting" the two
claims by Ostrofe - the industry's conspiracy to boycott him versus
Crocker's unilateral action against him in furtherance of the overall
conspiracy. The court held that such a fragmentation led to "erroneous
rulings on the motions to dismiss, to amend the complaint, and for
summary judgment."' 39 The majority held that Ostrofe had standing
to allege the overall conspiracy in conjunction with the alleged boycott.
He also had standing to allege that Crocker unilaterally refused to deal
with him as a means of furthering that conspiracy.
14°
Bichan
The facts in Bichan v. Chemetron Corp. 141 were similar to those in
Ostrofe. The plaintiff, Robert Bichan, was the president of defendant
Chemetron's Industrial Gas Division. Chemetron allegedly entered
into a conspiracy to fix prices and allocate markets with other members
of the industrial gas industry. Bichan ignored this agreement and com-
peted successfully for new customers, causing complaints from other
conspiracy members. Shortly thereafter, he was fired.' 42
Bichan was unable to find a similar position in the industry.143 He
then brought suit against Chemetron and the other alleged conspira-
tors, seeking treble damages under section 4 for injuries sustained due
to the defendants' violations of the Sherman Act. 44 The district court
entered judgment for the defendants, based on Bichan's lack of anti-
trust standing and antitrust injury. 45 The Seventh Circuit unani-
mously affirmed the judgment. 146 It found that Bichan's injury was not
States v. H.S. Crocker Co., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,883 (N.D.Cal. 1976); United
States v. H.S. Crocker Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,615 (N.D.Cal. 1975).
138. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1380-81.
139. Id at 1381.
140. Id at 1388-89. The dissent disagreed with both holdings. See id at 1389-92 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting). This Comment deals mainly with the second holding, regarding
Crocker's unilateral refusal to deal. The first holding, regarding the boycott, was rather
summarily resolved by the majority, as the boycott itself was a violation of the Sherman Act.
Id at 1381-82. As mentioned, Ostrofe's proof for this claim was weak. See supra note 136.
141. 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983).
142. Id at 515.
143. This is in marked contrast to Ostofe, in which the plaintiff did not look for a similar
job in the industry. See supra note 136.
144. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d at 515.
145. Id
146. Id at 515, 520.
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an antitrust injury' 47 and, even if it had been, it was too remote from
the antitrust violations to give him standing to sue.148 Moreover,
Bichan lacked antitrust standing under the Seventh Circuit's conserva-
tive target area test.149
Discussion of the Ostrofe Decision: The Ninth Circuit Takes a
New Approach
While acknowledging the established antitrust standing cases and
tests, the Ninth Circuit majority actually disregarded precedent 150 and
set forth a new "policy balancing test."'15' On one side of this test is the
interest in effective enforcement of the antitrust laws, with the private
action being a "bulwark."' 152 On the other side is the interest in avoid-
ing vexatious litigation and excessive liability: "floodgates" and
"overkill."' 53 In Ostrofe, the court found that the former outweighed
the latter. 54 What the court failed to acknowledge was that the balanc-
ing of these two policies has been the underlying objective of all the
antitrust standing tests.' 55 The Ostrofe court restricted the use of those
147. Id at 516-19. The Seventh Circuit based this holding on a narrow interpretation of
Brunswick, reasoning that the injury to the plaintiff must be caused by the anti-competitive
effect of the violation. See generally supra notes 70-80 & accompanying text.
148. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d at 519-20. The court here relied mainly on
Illinois Brick, using the Supreme Court decision for its discussion of both antitrust injury
and antitrust standing. See generally supra notes 62-64 & accompanying text.
149. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d at 518-19. The court applied a narrow target
area test based on Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979). The Seventh Circuit recognized the conflict that its decision
created with the Ninth Circuit. The circuit decided not to hear the case en banc. The
Bichan court directly confronted the Ostrofe holding and disagreed, choosing to support
Judge Kennedy's dissent. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d at 514, 518-19.
150. The dissent chastises the majority on this point. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co.,
670 F.2d at 1389-92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("It]his circuit's line of precedent is sound, yet
the majority simply and erroneously ignores it").
151. Name given by the author. The Ostrofe court disdained "tests" and did not name
the one it developed to handle the unilateral act issue, or even admit that it was announcing
one. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1382-83. The court's balancing test was heav-
ily influenced by a prominent law review article. See Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical
Framework/or Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977). Other commentators have also
suggested a balancing test approach to antitrust standing. See, e.g., Handler, The Shift From
Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits - he Twenty-ThirdAnnualAntitrust
Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 30 (1977); Note,Antitrust -Balancing Analysis to Determine
Standing -McCready v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 1981 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1105, 1114.
152. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1383 (quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968)).
153. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1383 (quoting Calderone Enter. Corp. v.
United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 930 (1972)).
154. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1383-84.
155. See supra notes 8-50 & accompanying text. Ten years earlier, one commentator
tests to "resolv[ing] clear cases."'156
Furtherance of Effective Antitrust Enforcement
The Ninth Circuit offered several reasons why allowing Ostrofe to
sue for treble damages would further effective antitrust enforcement.
First, section 1 violations are nearly always covert, so their detection
often depends on disclosure by an insider. Since the chance of criminal
liability is slight, without the civil treble damages remedy there is little
incentive for an insider to betray the conspiracy. 157 However, the court
failed to recognize that the reason section 1 violations are usually cov-
ert is because they are per se illegal, 158 and therefore the chance of
criminal prosecution is actually higher.1 59
Second, the court believed that the chance for a civil recovery by
Ostrofe outside of antitrust treble damages was slim.160 This reasoning
was faulty, since the expansion or contraction of antitrust recoveries
should not depend upon the availability of other remedies. 161 The anti-
trust laws were not intended to be a "panacea for all wrongs."'162 Anti-
trust standing analysis should not turn on the availibility of another
remedy, since enforcement, not compensation, is the primary rationale
of antitrust standing. 163 A contrary stance could cause more plaintiffs
observed that the federal courts had been attempting to "balance the purpose and worth of
the treble damage remedy against the unfairness of permitting windfall damages" for sixty
years. Comment, supra note 40, at 76.
156. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1382-83.
157. Id at 1384.
158. See supra note 3.
159. See generally Posner, supra note 27, at 388-95 (showing, inter alia, that price-fixing
is a leading violation in terms of imprisonment for antitrust prosecutions); R. POSNER & F.
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 320-21
(1981) (updating data in 1970 article).
160. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1384. The dissent takes the opposite view
of Ostrofe's chances at an alternative civil remedy and argues the opposite way on this point.
Judge Kennedy indicates the growth in wrongful discharge recoveries, citing to California
cases. Id at 1392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This would not be of much use to a plaintiff in
a less progressive state. Further, it is an oversimplification of the problem to label Ostrofe's
injury a "wrongful discharge" and summarily conclude that it is not, therefore, an antitrust
injury.
161. "It is immaterial that block booking was or was not a breach of contract. Successful
maintenance of an antitrust suit does not depend upon the availability or nonavaiibility of a
common-law remedy for that wrong. The antitrust laws are an expression of federal public
policy to foster free competition. The treble-damage action was designed to implement that
policy. . . . That purpose would be frustrated by remitting to his common-law remedies
one who has been injured by such conduct." Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prod., 433 F.2d
1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971) (emphasis added).
162. Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 804 (7th Cir. 1961).
163. See Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prod., 433 F.2d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971) ("[t]he treble-damage action was designed to implement that
policy by encouraging private suitors to enforce the antitrust laws").
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to disguise their non-antitrust claims in antitrust clothing. 64
Third, since Ostrofe's discharge was "essential to the success" of
the conspiracy, the court reasoned that giving him treble damages
would increase Crocker's overall antitrust liability. 65 This assumption
that the discharge was essential to the conspiracy's success was an ana-
lytical error that ran through the opinion. Ostrofe's cooperation in im-
plementing the conspiracy, not his discharge, was essential to the
conspiracy's success. The successful operation of the conpsiracy re-
quired a cooperative employee in the marketing director position.
Crocker could have merely transferred Ostrofe and replaced him with a
sympathetic marketing director. That Crocker forced him to resign in-
stead did not make his discharge essential. This may appear to be a
rather fine distinction, but it is significant to the issue of antitrust in-
jury.' 66 The antitrust injury to Ostrofe was not the discharge. Rather,
the injury arose from being put in the position of choosing between
committing an illegal act or being fired.' 67 Moreover, arguing that ad-
ding to Crocker's liability would promote enforcement interests actu-
ally lends weight to the excessive liability concern on the other side of
the balance. 168
Finally, the court decided that allowing Ostrofe to sue would stop
antitrust violations in their incipient stages and protect other parties
from later antitrust injuries - injuries that due to the covert nature of
the violations might not even be detected.' 69 The discharged employee
is also an efficient plaintiff. it is less costly to society and to the defend-
ant employer to pay treble damages to the employee at an early stage of
the conspiracy than to pay cumulative damages to competitors and
purchasers later on.'70 However, this reasoning ignores the fact that
section 4 is generally considered a remedial provision providing an in-
164. See infra notes 174-77 & accompanying text.
165. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1384.
166. See infra notes 186-205 & accompanying text.
167. This distinction is also useful in defining the target area. See infra notes 212-13 &
accompanying text.
168. This raises an important question that will undoubtedly arise in future cases should
Ostrofe remain good law. What if Crocker had just transferred Ostrofe to a lower position
or denied him raises or promotions instead of firing him? What if it had found other "pun-
ishing" tactics or reprisals short of the forced resignation? Would there still be treble dam-
ages for those injuries, or just for discharge? It is noteworthy that Ostrofe was threatened
with just such actions. See supra note 131 & accompanying text.
169. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1384-85. The Supreme Court has found
that Congress intended the antitrust laws, specifically § 7 of the Clayton Act, to stop the act
"at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition. . . was still in its incipiency."
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962).
170. This argument is not as strong when applied to the Ostrofe facts because the con-
spiracy had already been uncovered and prosecuted. See supra note 137.
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direct deterrent, and not a prophylactic one. 17 1
Based on these considerations, the Ninth Circuit concluded this
side of its policy balancing test by finding that Ostrofe would be an
effective enforcer of the antitrust laws. He was the ideal victim to bring
the suit. 172 Despite some flaws and one-sidedness in these considera-
tions, on the facts of this case it was a defensible conclusion.
Avoidance of Vexatious Litigation and Excessive Liability
The other side of the balance, the interest in avoiding vexatious
litigation and excessive liability, was given short treatment by the
Ninth Circuit. 73 First, the court reasoned that employees such as Os-
trofe are not so numerous as to pose a threat of a ruinous burden on
industries. 174 This may be true, but the court failed to consider ade-
quately the possibility that the lure of such a recovery could lead to the
dressing up of claims as antitrust claims, especially when the damages
are treble and come with attorney's fees. The realities of vexatious liti-
gation, as well as the settlement value of any complex case, cannot be
easily ignored. 75 Allowing any discharged and disgruntled employee
to place his former employer in peril of treble damages with allegations
alone seems to be opening the floodgates to antitrust suits. 176 Ifper se
illegal acts, involving criminal liability, are involved, however, there
may be justification for such an opening. 177
171. See, e.g., J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 562 (1981);
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977).
172. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co, 670 F.2d at 1385. The Bichan court hardly discussed
the enforcement interests at all. The court declined to speculate on Bichan's contention that
he had been actively increasing competition in the industry, and would have continued to do
so, leading to the conspiracy's demise. The court found it "irrelevant" to antitrust injury
analysis - blurring the distinction between antitrust standing and antitrust injury analysis.
Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d at 518.
173. In contrast, the Bichan court gave nearly all of its attention to these interests, in its
discussion of antitrust standing, antitrust injury, and remoteness. See generally Bichan v.
Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d at 515-20.
174. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385.
175. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2709 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring), where the Chief Justice points to the time and money involved in defending even a
frivolous lawsuit. See also Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 478
(1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (treble damages "creates a special temptation for the institu-
tion of vexatious litigation").
176. The possibility of wrongfully motivated antitrust litigation has been noted in gen-
eral terms by various commentators. See, e.g., Lytle & Purdue, Antitrust Target Area Under
Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Determination of Standing in Light of the Alleged Antitrust
Violation, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 795, 800-02 (1976); Note, supra note 14, at 552. It is important
to remember, however, that allegations alone are not sufficient to recover treble damages.
The discharged and disgruntled employee still faces the costly and difficult task of proving
the alleged violation.
177. Per se violations are notorious for their covert nature. See supra notes 157-59 &
accompanying text.
[Vol. 34
March 1983] DISCHARGED EMPLOYEES UNDER SECTION 4 863
Next, the court made a series of rather summary conclusions, only
the first of which clearly fits within the interest on this side of the bal-
ance. The injury to Ostrofe was done to him alone, so there was no
danger of duplicative recovery. 178 Second, treble damages would not
be an unfair remedy in this case, as the court belatedly acknowledged
that the alleged violations by Crocker wereper se illegal. The defend-
ant knew or should have known its acts were illegal as it committed
them. Overdeterrence is not as great a concern whereper se violations
are involved. 179 Third, damages could be easily assessed, based on
wrongful discharge cases. 180 Finally, awarding treble damages to Os-
trofe would not constitute a windfall,' 81 traditionally one of the most
feared results of expanding antitrust standing.' 82
The Ninth Circuit concluded this side of its policy balancing test
by finding that allowing Ostrofe standing to sue would not subject
Crocker to vexatious litigation or excessive liability. 83 Though the
court's reasoning was again somewhat one-sided, this was also a defen-
sible conclusion. The majority then concluded that the interest in
avoiding such litigation and liability was outweighed by the enforce-
ment interest, so that Ostrofe was entitled to standing. 184 Despite the
flaws, this was the correct result under the court's policy balancing test
as applied to this factual situation. 185
178. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit
adopted the minimal view of Illinois Brick's rule, that it stands for prevention of duplicative
recoveries. See supra notes 62-64 & accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit adopted the
maximal view, that it stands for allowing suits by the most efficient enforcers only. See
Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d at 520.
179. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel,Antitrust
Suits By Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. Rv. 1155, 1156-64 (1982) (discussing
overdeterrence in a different context).
180. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385. This is an interesting assertion in
view of the court's earlier comments on Ostrofe's chances at an alternative recovery. It has
also been suggested that some system of apportionment of damages could be used to allay
fears of excessive liability. See California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc., 648 F.2d 527, 538-39 n.19 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 897
(1983).
181. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1386.
182. "Unfortunately, lower federal courts have demonstrated at times a tendency to be
more concerned with the possibility of a windfall recovery under the treble damages provi-
sion than with Congress' established intention to encourage private treble damage suits as an
enforcement of the antitrust laws." Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Cir-
cuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1301 (2d Cir. 1971) (Levet, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930
(1972).
183. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385-86.
184. Id at 1386.
185. It is ironic that the Bichan court's denial of standing was the correct result under
the more narrow antitrust standing test that the court applied, although the standing analysis
in the Seventh Circuit's opinion is largely secondary to its antitrust injury analysis. See
generally Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d at 515-20.
Brunswick and Antitrust Injury
The Ostrofe court recognized that simply finding antitrust stand-
ing may not be enough; there is a need to address the antitrust injury
concept of Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 186 After sum-
marizing the Brunswick decision, the court pointed out the lack of clar-
ity as to its scope - whether or not the antitrust injury concept applies
only to non-per se violations and whether or not antitrust injury is dis-
tinct from antitrust standing.' 87 The court made a distinction between
the claim based on "injury from the effect of an alleged antitrust viola-
tion upon competition"' 188 in Brunswick and Ostrofe's claim based
upon "injury stemming from conduct in furtherance of an antitrust vio-
lation." 18 9 The court failed to fully explain the ramifications of this
important distinction. It also failed to clarify to the scope of Bruns-
wick. 190 Instead, it simply found the rationale of Brunswick to be "con-
sistent" with giving Ostrofe standing to sue. 191
Criticism of the Ostrofe Approach: Disregard of
the Per Se Distinction
The Ostrofe court's resolution of the antitrust injury question is
both overbroad and vague. The best distinction between the situation
before the Ostrofe and Bichan courts and the situation in Brunswick is
that the former cases involved per se violations of the Sherman Act,
while the latter involved a section 7 violation. While Brunswick is
clearly not limited to section 7 cases,' 9 2 it "may not be as readily appli-
cable" inper se violation cases. 93 It could be argued that either the
antitrust injury doctrine does not apply at all toper se cases or that it
should be applied less stringently. While the former approach may be
186. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1386. See supra notes 70-80 & accompa-
nying text.
187. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1386. The Bichan court seemed to find no
such lack of clarity. It assumed that Brunswick applies to all violations, that it defines anti-
trust injury as "inextricably related to, and caused by, the alleged anticompetitive conduct,"
and that it limits § 4's protection to "consumers or competitors in a defined market." Bichan
v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d at 515, 519.
188. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1387.
189. Id.
190. This failure is especially relevant in view of the circuit's earlier holding that anti-
trust injury adds a step to antitrust standing analysis. See John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia
Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1977).
191. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1387.
192. See supra note 79 & accompanying text.
193. Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 599 F.2d 1299, 1303 (4th Cir. 1979). See also
Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1979), where the First Cir-
cuit lists four factors distinguishing the situation before it from that in Brunswick: §§ 1 and
2 are involved in this case instead of § 7; actual harm is present; there is proof of anticompe-
titive conduct in this situation; and diminution of competition was shown. Id at 13.
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easier to apply, the latter seems to be the more analytically sound. 194
The courts should be less hesitant to allow antitrust standing when
aper se violation is involved, since such a violation invariably causes
competitive injury. 195 Indeed, that is why the Supreme Court has con-
demned these violations.196 Aper se violation, such as an agreement to
fix prices, is illegal from its inception. There is no need to evaluate the
effect. Therefore, the means that are used to further that agreement
will be illegal, and injuries resulting directly from such illegal means
should be considered antitrust injuries. 197 When an employee is asked
or told to engage directly in price-fixing activity, both the employer and
the employee will know it is illegal, and possibly criminal. With a non-
per se violation, such as a merger later found to be illegal, the em-
ployee participating in it may not know it is illegal. Even his employer
may not know it is illegal until its effect is determined. 198 Therefore,
when applying the antitrust injury concept to a discharge situation, the
analysis should turn upon whether or not the underlying activity was
per se illegal. Such a bifurcated approach has been effectively utilized
in other areas of section 4 analysis. 199
The Ostrofe court perceived the "central theme" of Brunswick as
being a link between the alleged injury and the "core of Congressional
concern" in enacting the antitrust laws-the preservation of competi-
tion. 2°° The court then proceeded to expand that core to include out-
lawing acts in furtherance of the anticompetitive result. Since Congress
was concerned not just with the specific forbidden acts but also with
penalizing those who committed them, the harm done to one who re-
fused to commit such acts would be a "concern" of the antitrust
laws.20' It is this rhetorical stretch from forbidden results to forbidden
acts that brings the court's argument to its farthest limit.
Instead of offering any justification for this approach, the Ostrofe
194. This is especially true in view of Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465
(1982). There, the Court was dealing with a § 1 violation and it applied Brunswick-type
analysis, though in an admittedly less stringent manner, in its discussion of remote antitrust
injury. Id at 2548-52.
195. Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 599 F.2d 1299, 1303 (4th Cir. 1979).
196. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
197. Cf Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 674 F.2d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 1967) ("It is no bar to
recovery that... appellants' injuries did not result from the allegedly illegal restraint
... but rather from the means which Union used to accomplish that restraint.").
198. See Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir. 1973) ("Termi-
nation of employment will often occur whether a merger is legal or illegal.").
199. See, e.g., Solinger v. A & M Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304, 1312 n.9 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979) (in § I or 2 cases, the test is the location of the violation in
the area that the defendant should have or did foresee would be endangered; in § 7 cases,
the test includes whether or not the plaintiff is a component of the competitive
infrastructure).
200. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1387-88.
201. Id
court merely reasserted that Ostrofe's discharge was "essential" to the
conspiracy's success. It was intimately related to what made Crocker's
acts unlawful, thus satisfying Brunswick .202 Once again, it is better to
identify Ostrofe's cooperation as the essential ingredient for the success
of the conspiracy, not his discharge .203 The conspiracy required a co-
operative marketing director to carry out Crocker's nefarious plans.
The conspiracy to fix prices, allocate markets, and rig bids wasper se
illegal. Crocker placed Ostrofe in an impossible position. He could
either cooperate in the illegal acts, possibly exposing himself to crimi-
nal liability, or be fired.20 4 The antitrust claim by Ostrofe stemmed
directly from this wrongful discharge. Thus, the injury forming the
basis of the antitrust suit was "inextricably related to, and caused by,
the alleged anticompetitive act."'205
Recommendation: Adding the Per Se to Antitrust Standing and
Antitrust Injury Analysis
The Ostrofe decision appears to be result oriented.20 6 Although the
result reached was correct, the court failed to consider the long-term
consequence of the new test it devised to reach that result. Application
of an enlightened target area test, coupled with proper antitrust injury
analysis, would have reached the same result. Instead, the Ostrofe
court chose to unevenly apply a new balancing test, giving greater at-
tention to one side, and to twist the Brunswick antitrust injury doctrine.
By following precedent, interpreting it with flexibility, and narrowing
the scope of its holding, the Ninth Circuit could have reached the result
it sought and at the same time provided greater guidance for the lower
courts.
While the Ostrofe policy balancing test may seem desirable in
view of the persistent problems with the traditional standing tests, it
really does little to solve the problems that exist in the antitrust stand-
202. Id at 1388.
203. See supra notes 165-67 & accompanying text.
204. The close causal relationship between the refusal to cooperate and the discharge is
paramount. If Ostrofe had decided to cooperate and was injured in a car accident while
driving the company car on the way to fix prices, the injuries he might receive would not
become antitrust injuries merely because he was acting to further his employer's anticompe-
titive acts. The contrast may be crude, but it illustrates the difficulty in drawing lines. See
supra note 168.
205. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d at 515.
206. The impact of Ostrofe is not yet clear, especially in view of the recent remand by
the Supreme Court. 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). See infra notes 216-17 & accompanying text. At
least two Ninth Circuit decisions have addressed the Ostrofe decision, although neither of
them adopts the policy balancing test and both seem to attempt to limit the Ostrofe holding.
See Stein v. United Artists Corp., 691 F.2d 885, 897 (9th Cir. 1982) ("we considered in
Ostrofe only the policy against remoteness"); Thomsen v. Western Elec. Co., 680 F.2d 1263,
1267 (9th Cir. 1982) (factual distinction made).
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ing area. Instead of addressing the weaknesses of the established tests,
the court discarded the tests as useless in a tough case and came up
with a new test. This new test is not at all clear. In essence, the court
took the fundamental considerations underlying all antitrust standing
doctrine and melded them into a test in themselves. No easily defina-
ble or readily applicable test emerges from this melding.
The absence of an easily applicable test forces district courts to
engage in complex antitrust policy balancing in each case that comes
before them. A real test containing guidelines and buttressed by prece-
dent is needed.207 A major purpose of any standing doctrine is to lend
predictability to the judicial system, 208 an especially important purpose
in the area of complex antitrust litigation. A party should be reason-
ably sure that it is a proper plaintiff or is properly subject to possible
liability before that party gets to court. °9
A better approach would be not to discard the target area test
when a tough case arises, but to increase its flexibility, as the Ninth
Circuit has done in the past.210 The approach taken by the Bichan
court, that of rigid, routine application of standing tests, should be
avoided at all costs. Instead, there should be increased consideration of
the nature of the violation when defining the target area in a particular
case.21' One such consideration should be whether or not the violation
alleged isper se illegal. If it is, then the target area should be enlarged
and the concept of reasonable foreseeability more liberally applied.212
An employee faced with the choice of either cooperating in violating
the antitrust laws or being discharged should be in that target area.
Such an employee is a part of the "competitive infrastucture"2 13 for
207. See Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971) ("The private action. . . can only serve as an effective deter-
rent if the courts are able to administer it with some degree of certainty.").
208. Id. See generall, supra note 15 and sources cited therein.
209. Cf. Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292,
1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972) (mentioning the difficulty, even for
experts, to predict if certain behavior will violate the antitrust laws).
210. See supra notes 26-40 & accompanying text. See also Bosse v. Crowell Collier &
MacMillan, 565 F.2d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 1977) ("this court repeatedly has used the 'target
area' approach to antitrust standing"). In view of Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc.
v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983), the direct injury test appears
to be rejuvenated. The points raised in this recommendation could also be applied to an
enlightened direct injury test analysis.
211. See Lytle & Purdue, supra note 176, for an excellent discussion of this idea. See
also Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 923 (1971) ("the need to examine the form of violation alleged and the nature of its
effect on a plaintifi's own business activities").
212. See Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292,
1303 (2d Cir. 1971) (Levet, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972) ("the 'target area'
should encompass the foreseeable totality of competitive injury").
213. See John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 1977).
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purposes of standing analysis. A strong argument against any expan-
sion of antitrust standing has been the absence of bright lines in anti-
trust law.21 4 The distinction betweenper se and non-per se violations is
such a bright line.
This same consideration should also be applied to antitrust injury
analysis. When aper se violation is alleged, an injury to competition is
assumed by definition. 21 5 The problem is determining the sufficiency
of the relationship between the injury to the plaintiff and the injury to
competition. The analysis in cases involving per se violations should
regard injuries "inextricably related" to the means of effectuating those
violations as probable antitrust injuries. The analysis in cases involv-
ing non:per se violations should only consider as possible antitrust in-
juries the acts related to the effects of the violations. Though distinct
concepts, antitrust standing and antitrust injury are closely related and
the analysis of one should be consistent with the analysis of the other.
When the potential standing of the discharged employee is viewed
within this narrower, more precise framework it will also withstand
scrutiny under the "factors" set forth by the Supreme Court in Associ-
ated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. Calfornia State Council of
Carpenters.216 The causal connection between the antitrust violation
and the harm to the plaintiff approaches proximate causation. There is
clear intent on the part of the defendant employer to injure the plaintiff
employee. Placing the employee in an impossible position robs him of
his freedom as a participant in the relevant market. The plaintiff is a
single individual, the injury is direct and the damages are not specula-
tive. Since the injury is unique, there is no danger of duplicative recov-
ery. Allowing the employee who is discharged for refusing to
participate in the employer's per se illegal activity to bring his action
would encounter few of the "conceptual difficulties that encumber" 217 a
union's claim to "indirect" damages flowing from the coercion of third
parties.
The policy considerations set forth in Ostrofe should not be ig-
nored, of course. They should be essential considerations in defining
the target area and in identifying an antitrust injury. Greater consider-
ation of enforcement interests is especially needed to counterbalance
the vexatious litigation and excessive liability interests that have domi-
nated antitrust standing doctrine in the past. The substitution of both
214. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th
Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Morgan v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Calder-
one Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
215. See supra note 3.
216. 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983). See supra notes 96-98 & accompanying text.
217. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
103 S. Ct. at 910-11.
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these policy considerations, along with the factors set out in Associated
General Contractors, for the labelling and "talismanic rubrics"21 8 that
have plagued this area of the law would lead to a much enlightened
target area test.
Conclusion
The broad language of section 4 has posed a challenge to the fed-
eral courts for seventy years. The courts have responded to that chal-
lenge by developing the antitrust standing doctrine. They have devised
different standing tests, including the direct injury test and the target
area test, to implement the section 4 language. The doctrine and the
tests have produced confusion and conflict.219 The Supreme Court,
however, has not resolved the situation, choosing rather to set forth
only general guidelines for section 4 analysis.220 The Court has also
introduced the antitrust injury doctrine which, because of a similarity
of purpose and underlying principles, has further confused the antitrust
standing doctrine.221
The employee as a potential plaintiff has usually been denied
standing under traditional antitrust standing analysis.222 The key em-
ployee discharged for refusal to cooperate in aper se illegal scheme
defies such summary treatment. Such a plaintiff was before the Ninth
and Seventh Circuits in Ostrofe and Bichan.223 In Bichan, traditional
antitrust standing analysis and narrow antitrust injury analysis were
applied and standing was denied.2 24 In Ostrofe, the court introduced a
new policy balancing test, applied it unevenly and twisted the antitrust
injury doctrine to allow standing. The new test balanced the interest in
antitrust enforcement against the interest in preventing vexatious litiga-
tion and excessive liability, the fundamental principles underlying all
antitrust standing analysis. This decision raised several of the
problems with antitrust standing analysis in its policy considerations,
especially with regard to enforcement interests. 225
This Comment has traced these developments and problems, fo-
cusing on the discharged employee as a potential section 4 plaintiff.
The Comment recommends a middle ground between the rigid result
in Bichan and the wide-open holding in Ostrofe. It suggests a more
flexible target area test, with closer examination of the particular plain-
218. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 127 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Morgan v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
219. See supra notes 8-50 & accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 51-69, 87-100 & accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 70-86 & accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 101-28 & accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 129-44 & accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 145-49 & accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 150-205 & accompanying text.
tiff and greater consideration of the alleged violation. 226 There will be
no quick solutions to the problems within the antitrust standing and
antitrust injury doctrines, as both caution and flexibility must be exer-
cised. Introducing the distinction betweenper se and non-per se viola-
tions to the analysis, however, would be a positive step toward a
resolution of these problems.
John A. MacKerron III*
226. See supra notes 206-18 & accompanying text.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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